If you own a vpn concentrator you probably know the answer and more than me.
From what I understand, bridges are generally harder for surveillance entities to detect. Using a standard VPN alone can sometimes raise suspicion with governments or ISPs, potentially flagging your traffic for further scrutiny. Bridges, on the other hand, tend to obfuscate your activity more effectively, blending your traffic with more generic patterns. While VPNs are useful for routing your traffic outside the country, bridges offer a higher level of discretion. What specifically are you aiming to avoid? Feel free to DM me, or we can switch to PGP for a more secure conversation. Just remember to maintain good OPSEC practices, even when communicating with strangers online. 
ChatGPT rewrote what I said, corrected some grammar and hopefully made more accurate statements. 
but this is largely my own writing.
Nope I’m under informed. So far I’ve used WireGuard in combination with Tor Transport and DNS via ODOH dnscrypt with Adguard in between for filtering. All in a docker environment. So what are your thoughts please?
Wouldn’t the use of bridges though be defeated entirely if the government came across the bridge IP in the future? Then they could just correlate it with the data the ISP provided and do a timing attack.
Or am I missing something?
I’m using IPtables to route the WireGuard peer traffic through tor and split the dns to local dns.
If the government runs into your bridge and they want to learn more about this “ suspicious bridge IP” for a reason they determine is worth while looking into your fucked.
Bridging is better for people in Palestine, Afghanistan, China. As far as I know.
Seems like over kill. My main point is that bridges are secure. The FED (if that’s who you want to evade)don’t own enough relays statistically to de-encrypt your traffic so there is no worry from them. I’d remove as many different assets that you attach as possible because the menial possibility of further protection isn’t worth the increase in attack vectors.
I’m more thinking from the other side of things. Like, “Sir, we popped this random guy for weed, and discovered he was running a tor bridge. With all the ISP data and exit node monitoring we got 5 years ago, we successfully executed a timing attack on said data against this bridge IP and found the free speech journalist”.
Something like that.
The only exposed port is the WireGuard UDP port. All the services (Adguard, Dnscrypt, tor) run in their own containers locally under the same docker network.
I have the deployment in development at GitHub - NOXCIS/Wiregate: 🥷🏼 WireGuard VPN Server with WGDashboard for UI + TOR + DnsCrypt + AmneziaWG under the prion-tor branch. To give you an idea.
The FBI as far as I know are the primary investigators when it comes to crimes committed over TOR, and maybe some EU entities like Interpol. Both are unlikely to go after someone because of weed. If you use PGP to speak to other people it will not even matter. And Don’t give out personally identifiable information while on TOR unless it’s via PGP. If you are in the USA/UK I wouldn’t not even bother using a bridge. And remember the US Navy help invent TOR and IronKey is/was run by homeland security. So keeping TOR alive and healthy is in the interests of our national security.